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1 Introduction
A classical social choice problem is the following. A society formed by a set of agents has to
choose an outcome from a given set of outcomes. Since agents may have di¤erent preferences
over outcomes, and it is desirable that the chosen outcome be perceived as a compromise
among their potentially di¤erent preferences, they have to be asked about them. A social
choice function (a rule) collects individual preferences and selects, in a systematic and known
way, an outcome taking into account the prole of revealed preferences.
This classical approach assumes that the composition of the society is xed and, in par-
ticular, independent of the chosen outcome. There are situations for which this assumption
may not be appropriate. For instance, in the case of an excludable and costly public good,
agentspreferences may depend on the level of the public good and on the size of the set of
agents consuming (and contributing to nance) it. Also, when membership is voluntary in a
double sense: no agent can be forced to belong to the nal society and any agent can be part
of it, if the agent whishes to be. A prototypical example of this class of problems is a political
party, whose membership may depend on the positions the party takes on issues like the death
penalty, abortion or the possibility of allowing a region of a country to become independent.
Or when no agent can be forced to belong to the nal society but to be a member requires some
kind of approval of the current members. For example, a department whose members decide
upon its new members but then a professor, already a member of the department, may start
looking for a position elsewhere if he considers that the recruitment of the department has
not been satisfactory to his standards; and this in turn might trigger further exits. Or nally,
when no stability property is required since agents can simultaneously be forced to remaining
and to be excluded from the nal society. For example, extremely hierarchical societies like
traditional families, religious orders or criminal organizations.1 To be able to deal with such
situations the classical social choice model has to be modied. Agentspreferences have to be
extended to order pairs formed by the nal society and the chosen outcome.
There is a large literature that has already considered explicitly the dependence of the
1All these examples will be included as particular instances of our model. However, the strong incentive
requirement of strategy-proofness will be incompatible with any stability notion related to voluntary member-
ship.
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nal society on its choices in specic settings, in terms of two issues: the voting methods
under which members choose the outcome, and the timing under which members reconsider
their membership. See for instance Roberts (1999), Demange and Wooders (2005), and Berga,
Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2006) for problems related to the club model; Barberà, Son-
nenschein and Zhou (1991), Barberà, Maschler and Shalev (2001), and Berga, Bergantiños,
Massó and Neme (2004, 2007) for a society choosing a subset of new members; and Jackson
and Nicolò (2004) for a provision of excludable public goods when agents care also about the
number of other consumers. In the last section of the paper, we comment with more detail
some of this literature.
In this paper we look at the general setting without being specic about the two issues, and
by not requiring a priori any stability property on the nal society. We do that by considering
that the set of alternatives are all pairs formed by a subset of the original society (an element
in 2N ; the subset of the set of agents N that will remain in the society) and an outcome in
the set X. Then, we assume that agentspreferences are dened over the set of alternatives
2N X and satisfy two requirements. First, each agent has strict preferences between any two
alternatives, provided he belongs to at least one of the two corresponding societies. Second,
each agent is indi¤erent between any two alternatives, provided he is not a member of any of
the two corresponding societies; namely, agents that do not belong to the nal society do not
care about neither its composition nor the chosen outcome.2
We consider rules that operate on this restricted domain of preference proles by selecting,
for each prole, an alternative (a nal society and an outcome); that is, direct revelation
mechanisms. Note that the alternative chosen by a rule at a preference prole may be the
consequence of the application of a potentially complex mechanism, where agentsbehavior
are driven by (and linked to) their preferences over the set of alternatives.3 We abstract
from this, by focusing on direct revelation mechanisms. An agent that understands the e¤ect
of his revealed preference on the chosen alternative faces the strategic problem of selecting
it. Depending on the rule under consideration, the agent may realize that the solution to
this problem is ambiguous because it may depend on the agents expectations that he has
about the revealed preferences of the others, and in turn he may also realize that to formulate
hypothesis about those revealed preferences require hypothesis about the othersexpectations,
2See the last section of the paper for a discussion about the consequences of requiring stronger domain
restrictions.
3For instance, complex and sequential algorithms dened for matching problems induce rules mapping
preference proles into alternatives.
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and so on. Strategy-proof rules make all these considerations unnecessary since truthtelling
is a weakly dominant strategy of the direct revelation mechanism at each prole; namely,
each agents decision problem is independent of the revealed preferences by the others, and
truth-telling is an optimal decision. In addition to strategy-proofness, we will also consider
two weak versions of e¢ ciency and non-bossiness. A rule is unanimous if it always selects an
alternative belonging to the set of common best alternatives, whenever this set is nonempty.
A rule is outsider independent if it is invariant with respect to the change of preferences of an
agent who is not a member of the two nal societies.
Observe that the (natural) domain restriction under consideration requires that each agent
i 2 N is indi¤erent among a large subset of alternatives, all those for which i does not belong to
their corresponding nal societies; namely, i is indi¤erent among all alternatives in the subset
2S i X, where 2S i is the family of all subsets of N that do not contain i. Hence, the set of
individual preferences over which we want the rule to operate is far from being the universal
domain of preferences over the set of alternatives. Thus, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
(see Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975)) does not apply and the goal of identifying all
strategy-proof rules (or a tractable subclass) remains meaningful and interesting. We want
to emphasize that the reason why our model is not a particular case of the classical social
choice model, where one can directly apply the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, is the specic
domain restriction we are interested in. It follows from the particular indi¤erences admitted
over the set 2N  X which are natural for settings where agents, to enjoy the e¤ects of the
chosen outcome, have to remain members of the nal society and, at the same time, non
nal members do not care about the specic chosen outcome. Of course, without this kind
of indi¤erences, the domain of preferences would be the universal domain and the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem would apply, precipitating dictatorship.
Our result, Theorem 1, characterizes the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider
independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules. A serial dictator rule, relative to
an ordering of the agents, gives to the rst agent the power to select his best alternative, and
only if this agent has many indi¤erent alternatives at the top of his preference, the second
agent in the order has the power to select his best alternative among those declared as being
at the top and indi¤erent by the rst agent, and proceeds similarly following the ordering of
the agents. A serial dictator rule moves away from just dictatorship by using the loophole left
by the potential indi¤erences, present in the domain, and it does so by allocating the power
among agents to break the indi¤erences sequentially. Often, this can be done in a strategy-
proof way and satisfying at the same time other desirable properties like weak notions of
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e¢ ciency (unanimity), non arbitrariness (non-bossiness or order independence), or neutrality,
consistency, and so on. Serial dictator rules have been characterized as the family of strategy-
proof rules (satisfying in addition some other properties) in many di¤erent settings. See, for
instance, Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981), Svensson (1999), Papai (2001) and Bade
(2015).
In a companion note (Bergantiños, Massó and Neme (2016)) we consider the same setting
but assume that the preference prole is common knowledge (and hence, the strategic revela-
tion of agentspreferences is not an issue) and focus on the properties of internal stability and
consistency, which guarantee that the chosen alternative is indeed the nal one in a double
sense. Internal stability says that nobody can force an agent to remain in the society if the
agent does not want to do so. Consistency says that if the rule would be applied again to the
nal society it would choose the same alternative, so there is no need to do so. We exhibit
the di¢ culties of nding rules satisfying the two properties; however, we show that approval
voting, adapted to our setting, not only satises internal stability and consistency but it also
satises e¢ ciency and neutrality.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. Section 3 contains
the denitions of the basic properties of rules that we will be interested in. In Section 4 we
state, as Theorem 1, the characterization of the class of all strategy-proof, unanimous and
outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules. Section 5 contains the
proof of Theorem 1. Section 6 concludes with several nal remarks.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be the set of agents, with n  2; and let X be the nite set of possible
outcomes. We are interested in situations where some agents may not be part of the nal
society, perhaps as the consequence of the chosen outcome. To model such situations, let
A = 2N X be the set of alternatives and assume that each i 2 N has preferences over A.4
We will often use the notation a for a generic (S; x) 2 A; i.e., a  (S; x), a0  (S 0; x0); and
so on. Let Ri denote agent is (weak) preference over A; where for any pair a; a0 2 A; aRia0
means that i considers a to be at least as good as a0: Let Pi and Ii denote the strict and
indi¤erence relations over A induced by Ri, respectively; namely, for any pair a; a0 2 A; aPia0
if and only if aRia0 and :a0Ria; and aIia0 if and only if aRia0 and a0Ria: We assume that
4Note that we are admitting the possibility that the society selects all outcomes with no agent in the nal
society; i.e., for all x 2 X, (?; x) 2 A.
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each i does not care about all alternatives at which he does not belong to their corresponding
nal societies and i is not indi¤erent between any pair of alternatives at which he belongs to
at least one of the two corresponding nal societies. Namely, we assume that Ri satises the
following two properties: for all S; T 2 2N and x; y 2 X;
(P.1) if i =2 S [ T; then (S; x) Ii (T; y) ; and
(P.2) if i 2 S [ T and (S; x) 6= (T; y); then either (S; x)Pi (T; y) or (T; y)Pi (S; x) :
The fact that agentspreferences satisfy (P.1) is the reason why our model cannot mechanically
be embedded into the classical model and a specic analysis is required. We see property (P.1)
as being a natural assumption for our setting, and it is a critical requirement for our results
to hold. Let Ri be the set of is preferences satisfying (P.1) and (P.2), and let R = i2NRi
be the set of (preference) proles. Given S  N , we denote a prole R 2 R by (RS; R S)
where RS 2 j2SRj  RS and R S 2 j2NnSRj  R S: If S = fig or S = fi; jg, we write
(Ri; R i) and (Ri; Rj; R i;j), respectively.
We denote the subset of alternatives with the property that i is not a member of the
corresponding nal society by [?]i = f(S; x) 2 A j i =2 Sg. By (P.1), i is indi¤erent among
them; i.e.,
[?]i = fa 2 A j aIi (?; x) for some x 2 Xg :
By (P.1), (?; x)Ii(?; y) for all x; y 2 X and [?]i can be seen as the indi¤erence class generated
by the empty society. Observe that [?]i may be at the top of is preferences. With an abuse
of notation we often treat, when listing a preference ordering, the indi¤erence class [?]i as if
it were an alternative; for instance, given Ri and a 2 A we write aRi[?]i to represent that
aRia
0 for all a0 2 [?]i :
To clarify the model, we relate it with two of the examples used in the introduction.
The set of initial members of the political party corresponds to the set of agents, the set of
outcomes to the set of choices (X could be written as f0; 1g3 where for instance, x = (0; 1; 0)
would correspond to the choices of not supporting the death penalty, admitting abortion, and
standing against the independence of the region) and the set S, if the chosen alternative is
(S; x), corresponds to the set of nal members of the party that want to stay after it supports
outcome x. Similarly, all professors in the department correspond to the agents, the set of
outcomes X to all subsets of hired candidates (again, an outcome x 2 X could be identied
with x = (x1; : : : ; xK) 2 f0; 1gK ; where K is the number of candidates and xk = 1 if and only
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if candidate k is hired) and the set S; if the chosen alternative is (S; x); corresponds to the set
of professors who remain in the department after x has been selected.
Given A0  A and Ri, the choice of i in A0 at Ri is the set of best alternatives in A0
according to Ri; namely,
C (A0; Ri) = fa 2 A0 j aRia0 for all a0 2 A0g :
Since the set 2N X is nite, the choice set is well-dened and non-empty.
We dene three di¤erent sets that we will use later on, all related to Ri. The top of Ri;
denoted by  (Ri) ; is the set of all best alternatives according to Ri; namely,
 (Ri) = fa 2 A j aRia0 for all a0 2 Ag :
Of course, C(A;Ri) = (Ri): The lower contour set of Ri at a; denoted by L (a;Ri) ; is the
set of alternatives that are at least as bad as a according to Ri; namely,
L (a;Ri) = fa0 2 A j aRia0g :
The upper contour set of Ri at a; denoted by U (a;Ri) ; is the set of alternatives that are at
least as good as a according to Ri; namely,
U (a;Ri) = fa0 2 A j a0Riag :
A rule is a social choice function f : R! A selecting, for each prole R 2 R, an alternative
f(R) 2 A: To be explicit about the two components of the alternative chosen by f at R; we
will often write f (R) as (fN (R) ; fX (R)), where fN (R) 2 2N and fX (R) 2 X:
Notice that we allow rules that choose outcomes (fX (R)) and agents (fN (R)) simultane-
ously but also rules that rst choose outcomes (or agents) and later agents (or outcomes).
3 Basic properties of rules
We present three properties that a rule f : R ! A may satisfy, and that we will use in our
characterization result. The rst one imposes a minimal e¢ ciency requirement at each prole.
A rule is unanimous if it selects an alternative in the intersection of all tops, whenever this
intersection is nonempty.
Unanimity For all R 2 R such that T
i2N
 (Ri) 6= ?, f (R) 2
T
i2N
 (Ri) :
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The next two properties impose conditions by comparing the alternatives chosen by the
rule at two di¤erent proles. A rule is strategy-proof if it is always in the best interest of
the agents to reveal their preferences truthfully; namely, truth-telling is a weakly dominant
strategy in the direct revelation game induced by the rule.
Strategy-proofness For all R 2 R; all i 2 N and all R0i 2 Ri;
f (Ri; R i)Rif (R0i; R i) :
If otherwise, i.e., f(R0i; R i)Pif(Ri; R i); we will say that i manipulates f at (Ri; R i) via R
0
i:
Outsider independence requires that any modication of the preferences of an agent who
was not a member of the society and remain nonmember once she changes her preferences,
does not modify the alternative chosen.
Outsider independence For all R 2 R, all i 2 N and all R0i 2 Ri such that i =2
fN (R) [ fN (R0i; R i), f (R0i; R i) = f (R) :
The notion of outsider independence was used in the context of public goods with exclusion
by Deb and Razzolini (1999), under the name of non-bossiness of excluded individuals, and by
Jackson and Nicolò (2004). It constitutes a weakening of non-bossiness, a property introduced
by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981). Di¤erent variants of non-bossiness have been
intensively used in the literature. Often, to eliminate arbitrary (and hence, di¢ cult to describe)
rules in axiomatic characterizations where strategy-proofness plays a salient role. Thomson
(2016) contains a systematic analysis of non-bossiness by giving alternative denitions and
interpretations of it, and by relating them to a large family of allocation problems. Outsider
independence requires that the rule does not change only after a change of preferences of an
agent that is not a member of the two nal societies, for which he is indi¤erent to. We think
that this is a natural requirement in our setting; otherwise, by changing his preferences the
agent could lead the rule to select di¤erent alternatives, inducing welfare changes to the other
agents but not to himself.5
5See the nal section of the paper for an indication of the class of strategy-proof and unanimous rules that
are not outsider independent.
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4 Characterization result
In this section we state the result of the paper characterizing the class of all strategy-proof,
unanimous and outsider independent rules.6 This class coincides with the family of all serial
dictator rules. To dene a serial dictator rule we need some preliminaries. Let  : N !
f1; : : : ; ng be an ordering (one-to-one mapping) of the set of agents. Given i 2 N; (i)
is the position in the order assigned to i after applying  to N . The set of all orderings
 : N ! f1; : : : ; ng will be denoted by : For  2  and 1  k  n; we write k to denote
the agent  1(k); i.e., the k-th agent in the ordering .
A serial dictator rule induced by  2  and x 2 X, denoted by f;x; proceeds (in up
to n steps) as follows. Fix a prole R 2 R and look for any alternative (S1; x1) in the best
indi¤erence class of agent 1, the rst agent in the ordering induced by : If 1 2 S1; set
f;x(R) = (S1; x1). Otherwise, look for any alternative (S2; x2) in the best indi¤erence class of
agent 2; the second agent in the ordering induced by , only among those classes satisfying
the property that 1 =2 S2; If 2 2 S2; set f;x(R) = (S2; x2). Otherwise, proceed similarly
until the n th step, if reached, by looking for any alternative (Sn; xn) in the best indi¤erence
class of agent n; the last in the ordering induced by ; only among those classes satisfying
the property that for each k 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g ; k =2 Sn: If n 2 Sn; set f;x(R) = (Sn; xn).
Otherwise, and since no agent wants to stay in the society whatever element of X is selected,
set f;x(R) = (?; x) : So, x plays the role of the residual outcome only when no agent wants
to stay in the society under any circumstance.
We now dene a serial dictator rule formally. Fix  2  and x 2 X, and let R 2 R be a
prole. Dene f;x (R) recursively, as follows.
Step 1. Let A1 = A: Consider two cases:
1. jC (A1; R1)j = 1: Then, C (A1; R1) =  (R1) : Set (S1; x1) = C (A1; R1) and observe
that 1 2 S1: Dene
f;x (R) = (S1; x1):
2. jC (A1; R1)j > 1: Then, C (A1; R1) = f(S; x0) 2 A j 1 =2 S and x0 2 Xg : Go to Step
2.
We now dene Step k (1 < k  n) ; assuming that at Step k   1; C  Ak 1; Rk 1 > 1.
Step k. Let Ak = C(Ak 1; Rk 1): Consider two cases.
6Observe again that the preferences we are considering satisfy (P.1) and hence, rules do not operate on the
universal domain of preferences over A: Thus, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can not be applied.
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1. jC (Ak; Rk)j = 1: Then, C (Ak; Rk) =  (Rk) : Set (Sk; xk) = C (Ak; Rk) and observe
that k 2 Sk: Dene
f;x (R) = (Sk; xk) :
2. jC (Ak; Rk)j > 1:
(a) If k < n, then C (Ak; Rk) = f(S; x0) 2 A j i =2 S for all i  k and x0 2 Xg : Go to
Step k + 1.
(b) If k = n, then C (An; Rn) = f(?; x0) 2 A j x0 2 Xg : Dene
f;x (R) = (?; x) :
Example 1 below illustrates this procedure.
Example 1 Let N = f1; 2g and X = fa; b; cg be respectively the set of agents and the set
of outcomes, and consider the ordering , where 1 = 1 and 2 = 2; and x = a: We apply
the serial dictator rule f;a to the following four preference proles, where we give the list of
the alternatives in decreasing order from the top and we only order the alternatives needed to
compute f;a at the four proles.
R1 R
0
1 R2 R
0
2
(N; b) f(S; y) 2 A j 1 =2 S; y 2 Xg (N; a) (N; a)
(N; b) (N; b)
(f2g ; c) f(S; y) 2 A j 2 =2 S; y 2 Xg
:
Then,
f;a (R1; R2) = (N; b) ;
f;a (R1; R
0
2) = (N; b) ;
f;a (R01; R2) = (f2g ; c) ; and
f;a (R01; R
0
2) = (?; a) : 
We are now ready to state Theorem 1, the characterization of the class of all strategy-proof,
unanimous and outsider independent rules as the family of all serial dictator rules. Section 5
contains the proof of Theorem 1 and three examples of rules indicating the independence of
the three properties used in the characterization.
Theorem 1 Assume jXj  3: A rule f : R ! A is strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider
independent if and only if f is a serial dictator rule for some ordering  2  and alternative
x 2 X:
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5 Proof of Theorem 1
We start by presenting an additional notion, two properties that a rule may satisfy and a
sketch of the proof that follows. Given f : R ! A; the option set of i 2 N at R i 2 R i;
denoted by oi(R i), is the set of alternatives that may be chosen by f when the other agents
declare the subprole R i; namely,
oi (R i) = fa 2 A j a = f (Ri; R i) for some Ri 2 Rig :
Notice that the option set of i at R i does not depend on Ri:
A rule is e¢ cient if it always selects a Pareto optimal allocation.
Efficiency For each R 2 R there is no a 2 A with the property that aRif(R) for all
i 2 N and aPjf(R) for some j 2 N:
Monotonicity requires that the chosen alternative at a prole is still selected at a new
prole if the alternative improves in the ordering of an agent.
Monotonicity For all R 2 R, all i 2 N and all R0i 2 Ri such that L (f (R) ; Ri) 
L (f (R) ; R0i), f (R) = f (R
0
i; R i) :
Since the set of indi¤erent alternatives for an agent coincides in all of his preferences,
monotonicity could be reformulated in an equivalent way by stating that for all R 2 R, all
i 2 N and all R0i 2 Ri such that U (f (R) ; Ri)  U (f (R) ; R0i), f (R) = f (R0i; R i) :
The proof that, for any  and x, the serial dictator rule f;x is strategy-proof, unanimous
and outsider independent is easy. The main idea of the proof of the other implication is as
follows. We rst show that any strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rule is
e¢ cient and monotonic; moreover, at every prole R; the rule selects the alternative that is
simultaneously the best alternative on the option set of each agent i at R i. These three facts
will be useful later on. The main step of the proof is to construct from f , and for every subset
of agents N  N , a rule g on the set of strict preferences over the set of outcomes X only,
which depends onN: Since jXj  3 (here is when this assumption plays a crucial role) and g is
onto (because f is unanimous), by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, g is dictatorial; denote
by d(N) its dictator. The remainder of proof consists of two last steps (the structure of the
options sets plays an important role here). First, a preliminary extension in which we show
that f has to be also dictatorial on a subdomain of proles (over A) related with the universal
domain of preferences over X (which depends on N) under which d(N) is the dictator of g.
Second, we obtain the series of dictators by applying the above result sequentially to N = N;
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and setting 1 = d(N); to N = Nnf1g; and setting 2 = d(Nnf1g); and so on. Finally,
the default outcome x, needed to dene a serial dictator rule, is obtained by looking at the
outcome chosen by f (together with the empty society) at any prole R for which (Ri) = [?]i
for all i 2 N:
We proceed formally by presenting some lemmata that will be used in the proof.
Lemma 1 Let f : R ! A be a strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent rule.
Then, the following hold.
(1) f satises monotonicity.
(2) f satises e¢ ciency.
(3) For all R 2 R and i 2 N; f (R) = C (oi (R i) ; Ri) :
Proof Assume f : R ! A is strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent. We
prove the three statements.
(1) Suppose R 2 R, i 2 N; and R0i 2 Ri are such that L (f (R) ; Ri)  L (f (R) ; R0i) and
f (R) 6= f (R0i; R i) : Three cases are possible:
1. f (R)Pif (R0i; R i). Since L (f (R) ; Ri)  L (f (R) ; R0i) ; f (R0i; R i) 2 L (f (R) ; R0i) and
hence f (R)P 0if (R
0
i; R i) : Thus, i manipulates f at (R
0
i; R i) via Ri; which contradicts
strategy-proofness:
2. f (R0i; R i)Pif (R) : Similarly, this contradicts strategy-proofness of f since imanipulates
f at R via R0i:
3. f (R0i; R i) Iif (R) : Then, by (P.2), i =2 fN (R0i; R i)[fN (R) : By outsider independence;
f (R0i; R i) = f (R) which is a contradiction.
(2) Suppose f is not e¢ cient. Namely, there exist R 2 R and a 2 A such that aRif (R)
for all i 2 N and aPjf (R) for some j 2 N: Let R0 2 R be such that for each k 2 N;  (R0k) =
fa0 2 A j a0Ikag and orders the rest of alternatives as Rk does. Consider the prole (R01; R 1) 2
R and suppose that f (R01; R 1) 6= f (R) : If f (R01; R 1) I1f (R) then 1 =2 fN (R01; R 1)[fN (R),
but this contradicts outsider independence. If f (R01; R 1)P1f (R) then f is not strategy-
proof. If f (R)P1f (R01; R 1) then f (R)P
0
1f (R
0
1; R 1) ; which means that 1 manipulates f at
(R01; R 1) via R1: Repeating this argument sequentially for agents k = 2; : : : ; n we obtain that
f (R0) = f (R). However, by unanimity, f(R0) 2 T
k2N
 (R0k) : Since f (R
0) = f (R) ; f(R) can
not be dominated by a, implying that f is e¢ cient.
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(3) Let R 2 R and i 2 N be arbitrary and consider a = (S; x) 2 C (oi (R i) ; Ri) : Since by
denition f(R) 2 oi(R i); we must have that aRif (R) : If f(R) = a, then the equality in the
statement follows (either as singleton sets or as the indi¤erence class [?]i). Assume f (R) 6= a:
Two cases are possible:
1. i 2 S: Then, aPif (R) : Since a 2 oi (R i) ; a = f (R0i; R i) for some R0i 2 Ri; which
means that i manipulates f at R via R0i: A contradiction.
2. i =2 S: Assume i =2 fN(R). Then, f(R) = [?]i = a; a contradiction. Hence, i 2 fN (R)
and aPif (R) : Now, we obtain a contradiction with strategy-proofness of f by proceeding
in a similar way as we did in the previous case. 
For the next steps in the proof, it will be useful to consider the set F of all complete,
transitive and antisymmetric binary relations over X: Namely, F can be seen as the set of all
strict preferences over X: Now, for each N  N; each i 2 N and each strict preference i
over X we associate a preference over 2N X (namely, an element of Ri), denoted by RN;i,
by selecting one among those satisfying the following features.
 If i 2 N; consider several cases:
 If i 2 S \ T  N; then (S; x)PN;i (T; y) if and only if x i y:
 If i 2 T ( S  N; then (S; x)PN;i (T; x) for all x 2 X:
 If i 2 S  N; then (S; x)PN;i (?; y) for all x; y 2 X:
 If i 2 S and S \ (NnN) 6= ?; then (?; x)PN;i (S; y) for all x; y 2 X:
 If i =2 N; then (?; x)PN;i (S; y) for all S  N such that i 2 S and for all x; y 2 X:7
Note that for each N; each i 2 N and each i over X there are many preferences in Ri
satisfying the above conditions. We just select one of them, and denote it by RN;i.
Fix N  N and dene a rule g : FN ! X as follows. For each subprole (i)i2N 2 FN

of preferences over X set
g((i)i2N) = fX((RN;i)i2N):
Lemma 2 below says that if f is strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent, then g is
dictatorial; namely, there exists j 2 N such that for all (i)i2N 2 FN ; g((i)i2N) = (j)
where (j) j y for all y 2 Xnf (j)g.
7The preference RN;i may not depend on i; but for simplicity we maintain the notation RN;i .
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Lemma 2 Let f : R ! A be strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent. Then,
for all N  N , the rule g is dictatorial.
Proof Fix N  N: Since f is unanimous, jXj  3 and g is dened on the universal domain
of strict preference proles over X; the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem says that if g is onto
(for each x 2 X there exists (i)i2N such that g((i)i2N) = x) and strategy-proof, then g is
dictatorial.
We rst prove that g is onto. Let x and (i)i2N 2 FN be such that for each i 2 N;
(i) = x: By denition of RN;i ; (RN;i) = (N; x) if i 2 N and (N; x) 2  (RN;i) if
i =2 N: Since f is unanimous and T
i2N
 (RN;i) = (N
; x), f((RN;i)i2N) = (N
; x). Thus,
g((i)i2N) = fX((RN;i)i2N) = x:
We now prove that g is strategy-proof. Suppose otherwise. Then, there exist (i)i2N ;
j 2 N and 0j such that
g(0j; j) j g(j; j): (1)
By denition of g; fX((RN;i)i2N) = g(j; j) and fX(RN;0j ; (RN;i)i6=j) = g(0j; j):
By denition of RN;i we know that for each i 2 N; each i2 F ; each x 2 X; and each
S  N with S 6= N; we have that (N; x)PN;i (S; x). Besides, for each i 2 NnN; each
i2 F ; each x 2 X; and each S  N with i 2 S; we have that (N; x)PN;i (S; x) : Since f
is e¢ cient,
f((RN;i)i2N) = (N
; g(j; j)) and
f(RN;0j ; (RN;i)i6=j) = (N
; g(0j; j)):
By denition of RN;j and (1)
(N; g(0j; j))PN;j (N; g (j; j)) ;
which contradicts that f is strategy -proof. 
Fix Ri 2 Ri and a 2 A: Denote by Ra;i the preference over A obtained from Ri by just
placing a, and all its indi¤erent alternatives (if any), at the bottom of the ordering. Formally,
Ra;i is dened so that a0Ra;ia; for all a0 2 A and, for all a0; a00 2 An fag, a0Ra;ia00 if and only if
a0Ria00: Similarly, Rai denotes the preference over A obtained from Ri by just placing a, and
all its indi¤erent alternatives (if any), at the top of the ordering. Formally, Rai is dened so
that aRai a
0; for all a0 2 A and, for all a0; a00 2 An fag, a0Rai a00 if and only if a0Ria00:
Lemma 3 Let f : R ! A be strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent, and
let R 2 R and i; j 2 S  N be such that i 6= j; f(R) = (S; x) and joi (R i)j  3: Then,
joj (R j)j = 1:
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Proof Set a = (S; x): Since f(R) = a; a 2 oi (R i)[oj (R j) : Suppose joj (R j)j  2 holds.
Since joi (R i)j  3; we can nd a0 2 oi (R i) n fag and a00 2 oj (R j) n fag such that a0 6= a00:
Consider any R0i 2 Ri; where
R0i =
(
Ra00;i if aPia00
Ra
00
i if a
00Pia:
Notice that a00Iia does not hold since i 2 S and a = (S; x): Symmetrically, consider any
R0j 2 Rj, where
R0j =
(
Ra0;j if aPja0
Ra
0
j if a
0Pja:
Again, a0Ija does not hold since j 2 S and a = (S; x): By monotonicity, f(R) = f
 
R0j; R j

=
f (R0i; R i) = f
 
R0i; R
0
j; R i;j

= a; where remember that R i;j means RNnfi;jg:
Claim 1: (i) oi (R i) = oi(R0j; R i;j) and (ii) oj (R j) = oj(R
0
i; R i;j):
Proof: We only prove (i) (the proof of (ii) is similar and we omit it). Suppose otherwise
and assume oi (R i) noi(R0j; R i;j) 6= ? (the proof of the other case oi(R0j; R i;j)noi (R i) 6= ?
is similar and we omit it). Take any ea 2 oi (R i) noi(R0j; R i;j): Since ea 2 (Reai ), by (3)
of Lemma 1, f(R
ea
i ; R i) = C(oi(R i); R
ea
i ). Hence, f(R
ea
i ; R i) = ea: Since ea =2 oi(R0j; R i;j);
f(R
ea
i ; R
0
j; R i;j) 6= ea: Hence, L(f(Reai ; R0j; R i;j); Reai )  L(f(Reai ; R0j; R i;j); Ri). Since f is
monotone, f(R
ea
i ; R
0
j; R i;j) = f(Ri; R
0
j; R i;j) = a: We now distinguish between two cases
(observe that eaI 0ja does not hold because j 2 S and a = (S; x)).
Case 1: eaP 0ja: Then,
f(R
ea
i ; Rj; R i;j) = eaP 0ja = f(Reai ; R0j; R i;j):
Thus, j manipulates f at (R
ea
i ; R
0
j; R i;j) via Rj; which is a contradiction.
Case 2: aP 0jea: By denition of R0j; aPjea: Then,
f(R
ea
i ; R
0
j; R i;j) = aPjea = f(Reai ; Rj; R i;j):
Thus, j manipulates f at (R
ea
i ; Rj; R i;j) via R
0
j; which is also a contradiction. 
We now dene two new preferences, ~Ri and ~Rj, where
~Ri =
(
(Ra00;i)
a0 if aPia00
(R
a0
i )
a00 if a00Pia
and
~Rj =
(
(Ra0;j)
a00 if aPja0
(Ra
00
j )
a0 if a0Pa:
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Claim 2: (i) f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j) = a
0 and (ii) f(R0i; ~Rj; R i;j) = a
00:
Proof: We only prove (i) (the proof of (ii) is similar and we omit it). Since a0 2 oi (R i),
by (i) in Claim 1, a0 2 oi(R0j; R i;j): If aPia00, C(oi(R0j; R i;j); ~Ri) = a0. Since f is strategy-
proof, f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j) = a
0: If a00Pia; a00 2 ( ~Ri): Assume rst that a00 2 oi(R0j; R i;j). Since
f is strategy-proof, f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j) = a
00: Since f(R0i; R
0
j; R i;j) = a, i manipulates f at
(R0i; R
0
j; R i;j) via ~Ri; a contradiction. Hence, a
00 =2 oi(R0j; R i;j): Since a0 2 oi(R0j; R i;j) and
f is strategy-proof, f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j) = a
0 because a0 = C(Anfa00g; ~Ri): 
We now proceed with the proof of Lemma 3 by considering four di¤erent cases:
(1) Assume aPia00: Since f(R0i; ~Rj; R i;j) = a
00 by (ii) in Claim 2, U(f(R0i; ~Rj; R i;j); R
0
i) =
A. Hence, U(f(R0i; ~Rj; R i;j); ~Ri)  U(f(R0i; ~Rj; R i;j); R0i); and by monotonicity,
f( ~Ri; ~Rj; R i;j) = f(R0i; ~Rj; R i;j) = a
00:
(2) Assume a00Pia: Since f(R0i; ~Rj; R i;j) = a
00 by (ii) in Claim 2, L(f(R0i; ~Rj; R i;j); ~Ri) =
A. Hence, L(f(R0i; ~Rj; R i;j); R
0
i)  L(f(R0i; ~Rj; R i;j); ~Ri); and by monotonicity,
f( ~Ri; ~Rj; R i;j) = f(R0i; ~Rj; R i;j) = a
00:
(3) Assume aPja0: Since f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j) = a
0 by (i) in Claim 2, U(f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j); R
0
j) = A.
Hence, U(f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j); ~Rj)  U(f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j); R0j); and by monotonicity,
f( ~Ri; ~Rj; R i;j) = f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j) = a
0:
(4) Assume a0Pja: Since f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j) = a
0 by (i) in Claim 2, L(f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j); ~Rj) = A.
Hence, L(f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j); R
0
j)  L(f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j); ~Rj); and by monotonicity,
f( ~Ri; ~Rj; R i;j) = f( ~Ri; R0j; R i;j) = a
0:
Thus, in each of the four possible cases aPia00 and aPja0; aPia00 and a0Pja; a00Pia and aPja0,
and a00Pia and a0Pja; we have that f( ~Ri; ~Rj; R i;j) = a00 and f( ~Ri; ~Rj; R i;j) = a0; which is a
contradiction with a0 6= a00. 
Given N  N , by Lemma 2, the rule g (induced by f) is dictatorial on its domain FN :
Let d (N) 2 N be the dictator. Using the identication described just before Lemma 2, for
every i 2 N and any (N;i), choose a particular RN;i 2 Ri. Consider the subdomain
RN = fR 2 R j R = (RN;i)i2N for some (i)i2N 2 FN
g:
Lemma 4 Let N  N and R 2 R be such that (i) (Rd(N)) = (N; x) for some x 2 X
and (ii) for all j 2 NnN; Rj 2 RNj : Then, f (R) = (N; x) :
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Proof Assume the hypothesis of Lemma 4 holds. Suppose rst that R 2 RN, and let
(i)i2N 2 FN

be such that, for each i 2 N; Ri = RN;i : By Lemma 2, fX (R) =
g((i)i2N) = x: By the denition of (RN;i)i2N ; (N; x) 2
T
j2NnN
 (Rj) : By e¢ ciency,
fN (R) = N
: Hence,
f (R) = (N; x) (2)
for all R 2 RN such that (Rd(N)) = (N; x).
Now, let R 2 R be such that (i) (Rd(N)) = (N; x) and (ii) there exists i 2 Nnfd(N)g
such that for all j 2 Nn fd (N) ; ig, Rj 2 RNj :
Claim A: f (R) = (N; x).
Proof: Consider any R0i 2 RNi : By (2), for all y 2 X; (N; y) 2 od(N)
 
R0i; R i;d(N)

: Since
jXj  3; od(N)  R0i; R i;d(N)  3. By Lemma 3, joi (R i)j = 1. Since (N; x) 2 oi (R i)
and joi (R i)j = 1; oi (R i) = (N; x) : Thus, f (R) = (N; x) : 
Applying successively Claim A above we obtain that for allR 2 R satisfying (i) (Rd(N)) =
(N; x) and (ii) for all j 2 NnN, Rj 2 RNj ; we have that f (R) = (N; x) and the statement
of Lemma 4 follows. 
Lemma 5 Let N 0 ( N 00  N be such that d (N 00) 2 N 0. Then, d (N 0) = d (N 00) :
Proof Suppose not. Let x 2 X and consider R 2 R where (i) (Rd(N 00)) = (N 00; x), (ii)
(Rd(N 0)) = (N
0; x) and (iii) for each i 2 Nn fd (N 0) ; d (N 00)g, Ri is any preference in the
subdomain Rfd(N 0);d(N 00)gi : By Lemma 4, with N = N 00, f (R) = (N 00; x) : Since d(N 00) 2 N 0;
we can apply Lemma 4 with N = N 0; and obtain that f(R) = (N 0; x); a contradiction with
N 0 6= N 00. 
Proof of Theorem 1 Let  2  and x 2 X be given. It is easy to show that the serial
dictator rule f;x is strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent. To prove the other
implication, assume f : R ! A is strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider independent. We
will identify from f an ordering  2  and x 2 X such that f = f;x: The ordering  will be
recursively dened by setting 1 = d (N) and, for all i = 2; : : : ; n; i = d (Nn f1; : : : ; i 1g) :
To identify x 2 X; let R 2 R be such that, for all i 2 N;  (Ri) = [?]i : Thus,\
i2N
 (Ri) = f(?; x0) 2 A j x0 2 Xg :
By unanimity, f (R) 2 T
i2N
 (Ri) : Set x = fX (R) : We now prove that f = f;x: Let R 2 R
be arbitrary and set 1 = d(N). Two cases are possible.
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Case 1. j (R1)j = 1 (i.e., (R1) =2 [?]1). Thus,  (R1) = (S1; x1) and 1 2 S1: By
denition, f;x (R) = (S1; x1) : If S1 = N; by Lemma 4, f(R) = (S1; x1): Hence, f(R) =
f;x(R): Assume S1 ( N: For each j 2 NnS1, let R0j be any preference in the subdomain RS1j :
Since 1 2 S1; by Lemma 5, d(S1) = 1: By Lemma 4, f(RS1 ; R0 S1) = (S1; x1). Let i 2 NnS1:
By Lemma 4 again, (S1 [ fig ; y) 2 o1(R(S1[fig)nf1g; R0 (S1[fig)) for all y 2 X: By Lemma
3,
oi(RS1 ; R0 (S1[fig)) = 1. Since f(RS1 ; R0 S1) = (S1; x1) ; oi(RS1 ; R0 (S1[fig)) = (S1; x1).
Hence, f(RS1[fig; R
0
 (S1[fig)) = (S1; x1) : Similarly, f(RS1[fi;jg; R
0
 (S1[fi;jg)) = (S1; x1) holds
when j 2 Nn (S1 [ fig) : Repeating this process for the rest of the agents in NnS1, we obtain
that f(R) = (S1; x1). Hence, f(R) = f;x(R):
Case 2. j (R1)j > 1: Then,  (R1) = [?]1 and set 2 = d(Nnf1g): We consider two
subcases separately.
Case 2.1. jC ( (R1) ; R2)j = 1 (i.e., (R2) =2 [?]2). Set C ( (R1) ; R2) = (S2; x2)
and observe that 2 2 S2  Nnf1g: By Lemma 5, d(S2) = 2: It is immediate to see that
f;x (R) = (S2; x2) : We now argue that f (R) = (S2; x2) : For each j 2 NnS2; let R0j be
any preference in the subdomain RS2j . Note that R1 belongs to the subdomain RS21 . Using
arguments similar to those used in Case 1 above, we can show that f (R) = (S2; x2) :
Case 2.2. jC ( (R1) ; R2)j > 1: Thus,
C ( (R1) ; R2) = f(S; y) 2 A j 1 =2 S; 2 =2 S and y 2 Xg :
Wewould consider again two subcases separately depending on whether jC (C ( (R1) ; R2) ; R3)j
is equal to one or strictly larger, where 3 = d(Nnf1; 2g):
Continuing with this procedure, at the end we would reach agent n = d(Nnf1; :::; n 1g)
and we would need to consider two subcases separately depending on whether jC (An ; Rn)j
is equal to one or strictly larger, where
An = f(fng ; y) 2 A j y 2 Xg [ f(?; y) 2 A j y 2 Xg :
If jC (An ; Rn)j = 1 then C (An ; Rn) = (fng ; xn) : Thus, f;x (R) = (fng ; xn) : Using
arguments similar to those used above we can show that f (R) = (fng ; xn) :
If jC (An ; Rn)j > 1 then C (An ; Rn) = f(?; y) 2 A j y 2 Xg : Then, f;x (R) = (?; x) :
By denition of x; f (R) = (?; x) : 
The three properties used in the characterization of Theorem 1 are independent.
Consider the Approval Voting rule fAV; dened as follows. Each i 2 N votes for the subset
Ai = fa 2 A j aRi [?]ig: For each a 2 A, compute the number of votes received by a; namely,
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jfi 2 N : a 2 Aigj : The outcome with more votes is selected. The tie-breaking rule  is applied
whenever several alternatives obtain the largest number of votes, where  : 2Anf;g ! A is
such that for all A0 2 2Anf;g; (A0) 2 A0: It is easy to see that, for any tie-breaking rule ;
fAV; is unanimous and outsider independent but it is not strategy-proof.
Any constant rule satises strategy-proofness and outsider independence but it is not
unanimous.
Let x; y 2 X with x 6= y: Dene
f (R) =
(
f;x if  (R1) = [?]1 and (f1g; x)P1 (f1g; y)
f;y otherwise:
It is easy to see that f is strategy-proof and unanimous but it does not satisfy outsider
independence.
6 Final remarks
Before nishing the paper several remarks are in order.
First, the equivalence between the class of strategy-proof, unanimous and outsider inde-
pendent rules and the set of serial dictator rules is a negative result. Serial dictator rules are
not appealing for many reasons. In particular, in our setting, they do no satisfy any stability
property: some agents may be forced to belong to the society and others may be excluded, all
against their own will. Although our general model was able to encompass problems where
the composition of the nal society could be endogenous (by being a consequence of the cho-
sen outcome) and stable, our result says that if we insist on requiring strategy-proofness only
serial dictators remain.
Second, this negative result holds because our domain of preferences under which we want
the non-trivial and strategy-proof rule to operate is, although restrictive, still very large. And
hence, one may ask whether there are interesting and meaningful subdomains admitting non-
trivial and strategy-proof rules. That is, what kind of possibilities can arise from imposing
further preference restrictions than just condition (P.2). Some papers have followed this line of
inquiry by considering stronger domain restrictions. For instance, for the case of an excludable
public good (in a linearly ordered set X of outcomes) when agents also care about the size of
the set of its users, Jackson and Nicolò (2004) identies classes of strategy-proof and e¢ cient
rules on the domain of single-peaked preferences on the level of the public good and alternative
specications of how agents order di¤erent sets of users. Roughly, those classes (which depend
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on the particular preference specication and may require that the rule be in addition outsider
independent) consists of selecting the size of the set of users independently of the preference
prole and then, choose the level of the public good according to a generalized median voter
scheme. Although some of the results in Jackson and Nicolò (2004) are also negative, they
identify restricted domains that admit more appealing rules; for instance, when preferences
on the size of the set of users come from cost-sharing considerations. Berga, Bergantiños,
Massó and Neme (2004) studies a particular instance of our model. It consists of a society
choosing a subset of new members, from a nite set of candidates. They consider explicitly
the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to exit, if they do
not like the resulting new society. They show that, if founders have separable (or additive)
preferences, the unique strategy-proof, stable and onto rule is the one where candidates are
chosen unanimously and no founder exits. In this case, the restricted domain of preferences
admits (non-dictatorial) strategy-proof rules that are in addition anonymous and stable. But
there are many other restricted domain possibilities, among which two appear as promising.
They are based on betweenness and separability requirements, as follows. First, assume agent
i has (x; S) as top-ranked and i 2 S: If i 2 T; then (x; T ) should be ranked higher than
(x; Tnfig); that is, (x; T ) lies somehow between (x; S) and (x; Tnfig); and since (x; S) is the
top-ranked alternative, agent i should prefer the alternative that is closer to the top. Second,
agent i has a strict order over X and a strict order over Nnfig and then, the ranking of
alternatives of the form (x; S); where i 2 S; must be consistent to these two strict orders (and
so, the preference would violate (P.1) as well). Most likely then, separability of the rule (as in
Jackson and Nicolò (2004)) would be a necessary condition of strategy-proofness.8
Third, the class of rules that satisfy only strategy-proofness and unanimity but fail outsider
independence is extremely large, even inside the class of rules based on serial dictators (which
guarantee that strategy-proofness and unanimity are also satised). Its richness comes from
the fact that, without outsider independence, the sequence of dictators may not be given from
the very beginning, and independently of the preference prole R 2 R. Instead, at each step,
the dictator may be selected as a function of the entire subprole of the set of agents, say S,
that have already declared that (Ri) = [?]i, for i 2 S: Then, the choice of the agent selected
as dictator in the current step could depend, in so many and arbitrary ways, on any conceivable
characteristic of the subprole RS; that its full and systematic description seems unworkable.
8We thank a referee of this journal for suggesting us these two domain restrictions. However, to obtain
full characterizations of interesting classes of non-trivial and strategy-proof rules, on the two corresponding
domains, seems to require a complete analysis, which is outside the scope of the present paper.
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We think that outsider independence structures in a simple way this arbitrariness by requiring
that the sequence of dictators is not prole dependent. In addition, together with strategy-
proofness and unanimity, insider independence imply group strategy-proofness, because serial
dictators are trivially group strategy-proof; however, it is easy to see that the rules that are
not outsider independent just described above, are not group strategy-proof because a change
in a preference of an agent may produce a strictly improvement of the welfare of another agent,
without a¤ecting the welfare of the agent that has changed the preference, and hence inducing
a group manipulation of the rule.
Fourth, our proof of Theorem 1 requires explicitly that jXj  3: In particular, in the proof
of Lemma 2, we show that the rule g, dened from f on the universal domain of preferences
over X; is onto and dictatorial. This follows from the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem and
the unanimity and strategy-proofness of f , which can be applied because jXj  3: And this
is a key step in the full proof. Of course, the case jXj  2 is interesting since jAj may still
be large, whenever the set of agents is large; in particular, if jXj = 1 the problem resembles
the Who is a J?problem, where a set of N agents has to decide who, among them, fullls
a specic binary characteristic, although we are not aware of any strategic analysis of this
problem based explicitly on agentspreferences over families of subsets of agents. But we have
not attempted to perform this analysis; it remains open for further research.
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